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SPECIAL SECTION
Agreeing to disagree
LGBTQ activism and the church in Italy
Paolo Heywood, University of Cambridge
In 2012 the Bologna chapter of We Are Church, a group of lay liberal Catholics who lobby 
the Vatican to adopt a more progressive position on various issues, including homosexuality, 
sought to pursue a dialogue with the city’s LGBTQ community. The relative success of those 
conversations depended upon We Are Church persuading their anticlerical interlocutors, 
whose antipathy toward the Vatican runs deep, that they were an entirely different entity to 
the Catholic “hierarchy.” But in prevailing in this endeavor, they created a further obstacle 
for themselves: the more convincingly they distinguished themselves from orthodox 
Catholicism, the less convincing was their eponymous declaration of “We Are Church”; 
the further they traveled toward the positions held by their LGBTQ activist counterparts, 
the more likely they were to be dismissed as unrepresentative of Catholicism, and thus 
irrelevant. Thus in this case ethics across borders depends not only upon finding affinities 
and sustaining differences but also upon finding affinities over how to sustain differences. 
Similarly, I suggest that debates in anthropology surrounding radical difference may benefit 
from attending to the ways in which such difference itself can be the subject of agreement 
or disagreement.
Keywords: ethics, activism, sexuality, Catholicism, Italy, incommensurability
This article describes a set of ongoing conversations taking place between the LG-
BTQ activist community in Bologna, Italy, and a group of liberal Catholics. These 
conversations are in many ways ideal examples of what the editors of this collec-
tion call ethics across borders: they involve attempts both to discover affinities the 
parties are perceived to share, and to respect the differences that set them apart. 
As the case I present here makes clear, however, those two endeavors are mutually 
imbricated. Affinities and differences alone do not constitute sufficient grounds for 
such conversations to succeed: there must also be affinities about difference, or what 
I shall call “agreeing to disagree.” 
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Taking this perspective allows me also to suggest, as I will do in the conclu ding 
section of this article, that whilst recently anthropologists have devoted a great deal 
of attention to notions of “radical alterity” and incommensurability, relatively little 
work has been done on how these differences themselves may become objects of 
debate and discussion for people other than anthropologists. In other words, as 
well as simply being different or alike, people can be different or alike over the is-
sues of difference and likeness themselves. 
Padre Pio’s Pride
The 2012 Pride in Bologna stretched over the course of more than a week of semi-
nars, parades, meetings, and, of course, celebrations. It included a wide range of 
LGBTQ groups with a diverse array of perspectives on what Pride ought to mean, 
and as such was a perfect opportunity for me to observe some of the internal dif-
ferences (often indeed over the nature of difference itself) within Bologna’s LGBTQ 
activist community, the subject of my doctoral fieldwork.
Yet in spite of the array of differences on display during Pride, there was a strong 
sense in which the various participating groups possessed a certain “continuity of 
purpose” (Strathern 1987a) despite—or perhaps indeed because of, as I suggest 
below and argue elsewhere (Heywood 2015b)—their concern for producing dif-
ference from fixed identities. This uniformity was particularly visible on the day of 
the Pride Parade.
Visible also that day, however, were a group who appeared different in a yet 
further sense—and the precise question of how and if indeed they were different is 
the object of this article. Amidst scantily clad transgender activists, grandmothers 
demonstrating for rights for their gay grandchildren, and an army of “love sol-
diers” arrayed behind a giant pink velour tank, something a little odd—at least 
for that day—was taking place in one corner of the square from which the pa-
rade commenced. Standing alone and looking somewhat forlorn amongst a sea of 
rainbow banners was a statue of Padre Pio, a twentieth-century priest and saint of 
the Catholic Church. For several hours, groups of soon-to-be marchers had been 
draping themselves over him for photographs, or festooning him with anticlerical 
posters. At a certain point in the afternoon, however, a different set of banners ap-
peared: “We Are Church,” these declared, held aloft by a small group of nervously 
smiling men and women, along with others that testified to the presence of gay and 
lesbian Christians that day. As the banners went up, there was a moment of tangible 
surprise from the surrounding crowd, punctuated by whispers and some giggling, 
but soon a smattering of applause broke out, and people began again to photograph 
Padre Pio, by now looking a little more dignified. 
A global movement which originated in Austria in the late nineties in response 
to scandals surrounding sexual abuse carried out by members of the clergy and a 
subsequent cover-up, We Are Church have evolved into an advocacy group for lay 
Catholics who believe that the positions of the magisterium on issues such as women 
in the priesthood, celibacy, communion for divorcees, and sexuality need rethinking.
Much of my research in Bologna focused on the unstable and somewhat para-
doxical identity of queer activists that emerged from their common concern for the 
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production of difference from fixed identities. My interest was in how far and to 
what extent this “continuity of purpose” could itself constitute an “identity.” Setting 
the complexities of this question aside for the moment, in a fairly obvious sense the 
activists I worked with shared some beliefs and opinions that We Are Church did 
not, and vice versa. For various reasons, the church is viewed with hostility, suspi-
cion, and occasionally outright hatred by many LGBTQ activists, who were thus 
unlikely to welcome its members, no matter how different they may have appeared 
to be from their brothers and sisters in faith. Equally, members of We Are Church 
obviously do not share the atheism and anticlericalism that unites most of the LG-
BTQ activist community, in no small part due to the Catholic Church’s vocal and 
vituperative opposition to gay and lesbian rights. We Are Church also set out with 
the explicit ambition of altering dynamics that exist within the church, with which 
they are often at odds. They thus exist, insofar as they seek to relate to what are 
commonly regarded as opposite poles of the political spectrum, in a state of ethical 
liminality of sorts, attempting, occasionally successfully, to initiate dialogue across 
what are often thought to be deeply entrenched barricades between putatively in-
commensurable worlds (Mair 2014; see also MacIntyre 1981, 1998; Povinelli 2001).
Such dialogues thus appear obvious candidates for an investigation of “ethics 
across borders.” Their basic and most fundamental problem appears to be how to 
find enough common ground in order not to be simply talking at cross-purposes 
to one another (cf. Strathern 1987b on feminism and anthropology), whilst not 
coming together closely enough that one partner’s identity collapses into that of the 
other. The problem with this formulation, though, is that it takes for granted the 
given nature of borders between identities; sometimes they take work to maintain 
as well as to break down. 
What this way of seeing the problem risks missing, in other words, is that iden-
tity and difference are—certainly in the case of queer activism—two sides of the 
same relational coin, and that succeeding too well at the first problem of ethical 
conversations risks failure at the second. No matter how distinct two groups may 
look, if difference is only ever a construction, then work must be put in to making it. 
This process was the focus of much of my doctoral research. For many of the 
queer activists I worked with, their difference from any kind of fixed or grounded 
identity (in gender or sexuality, say) was a virtue, and one that had to be regularly 
reproduced (cf. van de Port 2012). Androgynous clothes or makeup and partners 
of either sex, for example, were choices to actively reject fixity. More complicat-
ed but similar choices were made with regard to political action: initiatives that 
seemed too rigidly defined by particular objectives or ideologies (such as being 
strictly pro- or anti-marriage) were also often rejected by groups that preferred to 
remain fluid and undetermined.
Yet it was precisely this rejection of fixed identities that was always on the verge 
of itself becoming an identity, as clear and easily identifiable as those that were 
being actively rejected. This active rejection is thus what often held these groups 
together (just as it set them apart). 
Making a difference, in this sense, is what made many of the LGBTQ groups 
with whom I worked occasionally and in a very paradoxical sense the same: what 
they agreed upon was that and how they were different, difficult as this often was. 
This was their “continuity of purpose.”
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Most of my research, in other words, was about a situation in which it is the very 
ubiquity of and agreement over difference that is forever on the verge of becoming 
its own identity. In this article, by contrast, I explore a situation in which a quest 
for affinities meets a brick wall in the form of a failure to agree upon difference, 
making the two groups in question thus appear, in other important respects, too 
much the same. What they could not do, I will suggest, is “agree to disagree,” not 
in the straightforward sense of the phrase, but in the sense that what they failed to 
build and maintain was not so much common ground as difference. As the editors 
make clear in their introduction (this collection, and see Mair 2014), differences 
and affinities are necessary for ethics across borders. What I add here is that such 
affinities must also include agreement over the nature of those differences. 
We Are Church
We Are Church originated in Austria in 1995 following a scandal surrounding al-
legations of sexual misconduct by the then archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Hans 
Groër. Groër’s resignation and the perceived failure of the Vatican to properly in-
vestigate his behavior led five hundred thousand Catholics to sign the Austrian 
Church Referendum demanding greater transparency in the church, and to two 
million German Catholics signing a similar petition later the same year. These doc-
uments also called on the church, in the name of the spirit of the Second Vatican 
Council, to admit women to the priesthood, to abolish the requirement of celibacy 
for the clergy, to treat sexual orientation and reproductive choices as matters of 
personal conscience, and to focus its energies on issues such as peace and social 
justice. 
These demands, collated by the nascent We Are Church organization into a 
letter entitled “an appeal from the people of God” (We Are Church 2006), were de-
livered directly to the Vatican in 1997 by an international delegation. Though a re-
sponse from the pope was not forthcoming, We Are Church were born as a world-
wide movement (International Movement We Are Church) that included national 
organizations in, for example, Austria, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, the 
United States, and Mexico. Since then the group have become a significant force 
within the broader global Catholic reform movement, championing causes such 
as Austrian priest Helmut Schueller’s “appeal to disobedience” and the recent gay 
marriage referendum in Ireland.
My involvement with it began when I met Domenico, a leader of the group’s 
Emilia Romagna branch, a few months into my fieldwork with LGBTQ activist 
groups in Bologna. A number of friends within such groups with longstanding 
connections to him had mentioned his name as someone I ought to speak to if I 
wanted to understand more about how activists related to the church. His partici-
pation in the Pride celebrations of 2008 in Bologna was spoken of with respect and 
admiration. This was in marked contrast to the ways in which my friends would 
usually speak of anyone associated with Catholicism.
Domenico and I first met in a little ice cream shop halfway between his apart-
ment and mine, on a sunny afternoon in April. A journalist and blogger for a po-
pular local daily newspaper, Domenico, in his mid-thirties and then engaged to be 
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married, had a brisk air of efficiency about him. He had founded We Are Church’s 
Emilia Romagna branch together with two others in 2005, one of whom was gay, 
and so from the very beginning the group concerned itself with sexuality in par-
ticular. Other We Are Church chapters occupied themselves with other issues: 
that in Rome, for example, with Vatican rent. Another respect in which the Emilia 
Romagna group was distinctive was in its emphasis on not being a Catholic asso-
ciation: that is, Domenico explained, they were an association of Catholics, rather 
than a group which put religion at the forefront of its identity (and also rather than 
being directly affiliated with the church, like other prominent lay Catholic groups 
such as Azione Cattolica and Communione Liberazione). They have, he said, no 
desire whatsoever to be officially recognized by the Vatican, and they try to avoid 
organizing events that presuppose faith on the part of participants, such as bible 
study groups or church services; they focus instead on meetings, presentations 
of books or films, and debates. At the 2012 Pride, in fact, they would be hosting 
two such events in cooperation with Cassero, the largest LGBTQ organization in 
the city, part of a longer history of engagement between the two groups extend-
ing back to the last occasion on which Bologna hosted Italy’s national Pride in 
2008. Cassero, which is the name given to the Bologna chapter of Arcigay, Italy’s 
oldest and most established gay and lesbian rights organization, focuses its po-
litical activism on civil rights (such as marriage and adoption rights) and ending 
discrimination. Thus it often found itself in confrontation with the church. At the 
same time, as a well-established institution with local government funding, it had 
both a material and an ideological interest in being open to dialogue with other 
such institutions. 
One event would be the screening of a documentary on the experiences of par-
ents with gay children, followed by a discussion with the director, a participant, 
and two sympathetic priests, whilst another would be a discussion with a theolo-
gian and author of a recent book on Catholicism and homosexuality. On We Are 
Church’s position on homosexuality, Domenico was careful to begin by pointing 
out that the organization had not officially endorsed the idea of gay marriage, see-
ing this as a political issue for the state rather than a religious one. But they did 
take clear positions on ending discrimination within the church, arguing regularly 
against pronouncements from the Vatican condemning homosexuality as a sin.
Much of the theological justification that We Are Church employ for their posi-
tions is based on a distinction between dogma—articles of faith which are immu-
table, such as the immaculacy of Mary’s conception, declared ex cathedra, and thus 
infallibly, by Pope Pius IX—and positions taken by the church which may be sub-
ject to discussion. This sounds simple, and in some cases it is: the doctrine of the 
Immaculate Conception is what Domenico called a “foundation of faith”: because it 
was made “from the chair” (ex cathedra), it is an example of an infallible statement 
by a pope. It is, however, one of only two such statements, and debate rages over 
the infallibility or otherwise of other kinds of pronouncements: John Paul II’s dec-
laration of 1994 (John Paul II 1994) which sought to end debate on the question of 
women priests was not made ex cathedra, and therefore We Are Church (and many 
other Catholics) do not consider it to constitute church dogma; the position of the 
church, however, is that in issuing the statement, he was simply confirming a truth 
upheld by tradition (the history of the church) and by the magisterium (the pope 
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (2): 59–78
Paolo Heywood 64
and bishops) and thus making as infallible a statement as that made by Pius IX on 
the Immaculate Conception.
The church, Domenico explained using an Italian expression, thinks it has the 
truth in its pocket. This puts it in confrontation with others: it believes homo-
sexuality to be objectively, intrinsically wrong, and the LGBTQ community reacts 
(unsurprisingly) badly to this kind of condemnation. If, on the other hand, the 
historic Catholic injunction against homosexuality is seen not as dogma but simply 
a contingent dictum of the church hierarchy, a space for dialogue opens up; and for 
Domenico, dogmatic principles of faith ought to include only those questions upon 
which the church as a whole could agree. 
Jonathan Mair (2014) describes a similar practice of distinguishing between 
fundamental universal truths and local and contingent means of arriving at them 
in the case of Fo Guang Shan Buddhism. Fo Guang Shan’s practitioners empha-
size the objective and universal validity of certain truths and virtues, such as those 
of compassion and wisdom, and indeed seek to evangelize them (72). However, 
they combine this emphasis with the recognition that such virtues are always real-
ized in particular forms, and conditioned by historical and cultural circumstances 
(73). What this allows them to do is to reject a straightforwardly relativist approach 
to values in favor of a pluralist stance in which universal values become concrete 
in diverse ways and in diverse conditions. Similarly, whenever Domenico spoke 
about Catholic values—the universality of which he evidently believed in, he would 
speak of abstract principles (such as love, or tolerance, as I will describe below) 
that he might reasonably assume most of his interlocutors would share a belief in. 
For Domenico, whether one loved someone of the same or the opposite sex was 
an irrelevance in terms of the actual virtue that such love embodied, a contingent 
realization of an abstract universal. Where the Vatican was mistaken, in his view, 
was in elevating the condemnation of homosexuality to be found in, for example, 
the Old Testament to a similarly universal status, akin to dogma such as “love thy 
neighbor”; to the contrary, he argued, the church’s current position is a contingent 
dictum, the product of certain circumstances, and thus subject to change and to 
dialogue. 
Another theological basis for We Are Church’s understanding of Catholicism is 
the legacy of the Second Vatican Council. Convened by Pope John XXIII (known 
often as “Papa buono,” or “the good pope,” in Italy, and a hero to Domenico and 
many liberal Catholics) with the famously stated intention to “let some fresh air 
into the church,” Vatican II reformed the Catholic liturgy by introducing masses 
in the vernacular, placed a higher emphasis on ecumenism and interfaith dialogue 
than had hitherto existed, and—importantly for Domenico—attempted to realign 
the church’s relationship to the world, from a vision of Rome as a bulwark of faith 
in an essentially sinful and evil environment, to a more positive engagement with 
matters temporal. As Domenico put it to me, before Vatican II the church was the 
enemy of the world; after, it was supposed to be a part of it.
As his “supposed to” suggests, however, the legacy of Vatican II remains in 
dispute; for Domenico its promise went unfulfilled. John XXIII died before the 
Council finished its work, and his successor, Paul VI, reframed its purpose from 
“updating” to “renewing” the Church. Anticipated reform of the curia did not oc-
cur, with power becoming ever more centralized in the hands of the pope and his 
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (2): 59–78
65 Agreeing to disagree
ministers; furthermore, the new pope ignored the liberal majority on the council 
and took unilateral action on the issues of contraception and priestly celibacy, issu-
ing encyclicals which enshrined the church’s current positions.
We Are Church’s position on Vatican II is distinct not only from that of the 
church itself, but also from many other Italian Catholics who view the few reforms 
it did succeed in achieving as having distorted the church’s traditional positions. 
Although Bologna is not a natural home for conservative Catholics, one does oc-
casionally encounter such viewpoints. Drinking coffee in my local bar one Sunday 
afternoon, I met two of my neighbors, both observant Catholics, although in quite 
different ways: Simone was a retired lawyer in his sixties, quiet and dignified in his 
speech, whilst Alfredo was a construction worker in his late fifties, whom I had first 
met in our local barbershop, where his fervent views on religion often made him 
the butt of jokes. Both men having returned that day from church, I decided to tell 
them a bit about my experiences with We Are Church to see how they would react 
to their ideas: Simone was diplomatically noncommittal on the subject of LGBTQ 
Catholics, but viewed positively the ambition of reforming the church’s positions 
on divorce and celibacy; Alfredo, on the other hand, saw the group as the epitome 
of all that was wrong with post-Vatican II Catholicism. Unknowingly exemplifying 
Domenico’s critique of the church, he said that the truth is the truth and nothing 
can change that; Vatican II, he argued, had made no doctrinal pronouncements, 
and left everything it addressed more confused than it had been before. Homosex-
uality and divorce were sins, he insisted, and not even the pope could change that. 
Dialogues in action (1)
The position that We Are Church take with regard to the LGBTQ community is thus 
one that puts them at odds with more conservative understandings of Catholicism 
than that espoused in Vatican II, as well as with the official stance of the church. 
A more pertinent question for this article, however, is the precise nature of their 
relationship with the LGBTQ community itself. In order to explore this, I will de-
scribe the two events that We Are Church organized in conjunction with Cassero, 
as each exemplifies a unique problem with regard to the kinds of moral dialogues 
with which this collection is concerned. 
The subject of the first event I will describe was a recently published book, Omo-
sessualitá, by a respected Catholic theologian, Gianino Piana, in which he details 
some of the history of the relationship between homosexuality and Catholicism, 
and argues for an ethics in which the “authenticity” of a romantic partnership is 
what is important, rather than the gender or orientation of the persons comprising 
it (Piana 2010). The structure of the evening was a live interview with Piana, a be-
spectacled academic complete with tweed jacket, conducted onstage by Domenico, 
and followed by a question-and-answer session. 
Domenico opened the discussion by asking why Piana describes homosexuality 
as a “complex” in the book. Piana began by clarifying that the views he describes 
in the book are his own, and are not those of the magisterium, before responding 
that the word “complex” was necessary because homosexuality is a “complex pro-
blem,” composed of a variety of biological and psychocultural causes. Domenico 
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then moved directly on to homosexuality’s relationship to religion, asking about 
scriptural references to it and the church’s traditional teaching on the issue. Piana 
responded by noting that although the Old Testament condemns it, what it refers 
to is very different to the contemporary understanding of the word, and that in 
the New Testament it is barely mentioned. Church tradition, he argued, has con-
demned it because of the generally poor view in which sex for any purpose other 
than procreation has always been held, citing Augustine as an exemplar. Vatican II, 
he continued, following Domenico’s line of argument to me, attempted to broaden 
the definition of the family so as to make it more than simply just “a baby factory,” 
and the increased importance of love laid open the possibility that a loving couple 
composed of members of the same sex might someday fall within the church’s ap-
proved categorization. After Vatican II, however, came the turn back to tradition, 
with homosexuality once again clearly defined as a sin. Finally, Domenico con-
cluded the interview by asking about his subject’s views on gay marriage: Piana re-
sponded that he was not personally against it—although he found common ground 
with some of the more radical activists I knew in querying why marriage, an insti-
tution undergoing such a crisis, should be so desirable. 
Upon my arrival at the debate I had recognized a number of faces in the audi-
ence as members of Cassero, and their presence was made more evident during 
the question-and–answer session, as a number of them prefixed their queries with 
statements such as, “I’m not a believer”; indeed, despite his efforts both to clarify 
that his views were not those of the magisterium, and to attempt a (for him and for 
Domenico, at least) sympathetic reading of homosexuality through Catholicism, 
Piana’s visit soon became an opportunity for a number of Cassero’s members to 
air some long-held grievances against the church, and he thus often found himself 
having either to explain beliefs that he clearly did not hold, or simply to agree with 
the questioner, becoming a stand-in for the church as a whole. Most queries did not 
focus on him or on the substance of his presentation. He was repeatedly confronted 
about why the Vatican is so obsessed with matters of sexuality (“Shouldn’t they 
care more about murder and genocide?”) and why the church’s message of Chris-
tian love did not extend to the LGBTQ community (“Jesus didn’t condemn women 
and gay people, did he?”), and he looked increasingly bemused as he seemingly 
struggled between the professorial inclination to explain the complexity of such 
issues to a lay audience, and a reluctance to appear to be defending views that were 
not his own and were unlikely ever to be well taken in this particular context. The 
evening concluded on a relatively positive note, however, as Domenico intervened 
to ask a final question about Piana’s views on Pride and We Are Church’s participa-
tion: Piana eagerly took the opportunity to say that he believed Pride to be a very 
necessary thing, and that he was pleased that a Catholic group would be there in 
solidarity.
I lost Domenico amongst the audience that night, but when I caught up with 
him again a couple of weeks later he revealed his disappointment at the reception 
the speaker had received. People in the LGBTQ community, Domenico felt, some-
times treated members of We Are Church simply as representatives of Catholicism, 
rather than as individuals with their own views. The problem was that members 
of Cassero equated the church with the Vatican, and, understandably, they hate the 
Vatican; but this, he added, only helps you fight, it does not help you dialogue. He, 
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instead, tries to find points of convergence, rather than differences, in values such 
as equality and respect.
This was also evident on the day of the Pride march itself. At the parade, the 
hostility of many in the LGBTQ community to Catholicism was on full display. As 
I described in the introduction to this article, the statue of Padre Pio in the square 
in which the parade commenced was gleefully festooned with rainbow flags, ban-
ners, and posters bearing anticlerical slogans. Shortly before the procession was 
due to depart, Domenico and some of his colleagues from We Are Church arrived, 
taking up a position in front of the statue, and proudly, although with a hint of 
defiance, unfurling banners decorated with the group’s name and slogans in sup-
port of gay Christian men and women. The crowd of young people around them 
whispered and tittered to one another, but soon began applauding and taking pho-
tographs. I saw them again later in the day marching with their banners held up 
in front of them, and with the same air of pride tinged with self-consciousness, 
an island of faith in the midst of a world that had largely rejected it. A group 
nearby marched with a sign on which was painted, “Yesterday the Inquisition, 
today homophobia.”
 So Domenico had a problem, namely that his attempts at dialogue were foun-
dering because his LGBTQ interlocutors were identifying him and his group too 
closely with the Vatican. Instead of seeing the affinities he was trying to highlight—
such as a respect for “authentic” relationships, or a belief in love, which I will dis-
cuss with regard to the second event—they were focusing on their differences with 
an institution from which he himself differed.
At the time, I was convinced by Domenico’s understanding of the problem. But 
later I came to think that perhaps we had both misunderstood it. What I came 
to realize after the second event is that whilst finding affinities is undoubtedly a 
crucial problem in a conversation involving two groups with quite distinct values, 
those affinities cannot solely concern things about which they agree: paradoxically, 
they must also find and sustain affinities over exactly what it is that makes them 
different (to incommensurate, as well as commensurate, their values, in the lan-
guage of the editors’ introduction). In other words, what they had to do was to 
agree to disagree.
What we tend to signal when we use that phrase is the conclusion of a conver-
sation in the face of insuperable difficulties. One agrees to disagree with a person 
when one recognizes that certain differences of opinion will never be overcome. 
In this case, by contrast, I suggest that it functions as the precondition, rather than 
conclusion, of the kind of conversation with which this article is concerned. With-
out agreement on how exactly it is that the parties in question differ, the conversa-
tion becomes of a different nature to that which we have so far been describing, 
and, as I show below, of a great deal less interest to one of those parties. In describ-
ing this as “agreeing to disagree,” my intention is to emphasize the—to my view 
important—point that just as common ground cannot always be found but must be 
built, so the same is true of difference (especially in the context of LGBTQ activism, 
in which the production of difference is of such crucial importance). Conversations 
across borders, in other words, must also be conversations about borders, to the 
extent that the borders involved are rarely if ever found objects in the world but are 
instead precisely outcomes of the conversation in question. 
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Dialogues in action (2)
The second of the Pride events was the presentation of a short documentary on gay 
Catholic parents, followed by a question-and-answer session. Around thirty people 
were present, and the crowd was substantially different from the kinds of faces I 
usually saw in Cassero’s main event room (which was also their disco): there were 
few people under thirty present, and instead of being a sea of t-shirts and jeans, 
the room was filled with smartly attired men and women in dresses or shirts and 
trousers, many of whom looked to be over fifty.
On the stage, Domenico and some technicians from Cassero had set up a pro-
jector screen and five chairs: two of them were occupied by men in the familiar 
black suits and white collars of priests, and two others by middle-aged women, one 
the director of the documentary, and the other one of the two parents featured in it. 
Of the two priests, the first was Don Claudio, an elderly man in charge of a parish 
very close to Cassero; kindly and genial, he had been present earlier that evening 
for a discussion I had with Domenico and a friend of his, Daniela, spending much 
of it playing with Daniela’s baby. (When it refused to look at him, he joked that it 
had already turned anticlerical.) In previous years he had run a service of remem-
brance for victims of homophobic violence in his church, and also hosted the city’s 
only all-gay choir, to the ire of his immediate superiors; his defenses of such actions 
were a (somewhat mischievous-sounding) denial that they constituted him taking 
a different position to the church (on the remembrance service: “All I did was listen 
to a prayer”; on the choir: “I just offered them a room. They’re gay, it doesn’t mean 
they sing differently”) and an insistence that he did not require the curia’s permis-
sion to do what he wanted in his own parish (Scheggia 2009). The other priest, Don 
Romano, was a younger man, in his late forties, and from Foggia, where he worked 
closely with an LGBTQ rights group in that region; he had also won plaudits from 
many liberal Catholics by criticizing the church’s standing on priestly celibacy and 
homosexuality in an open letter to his bishop.
The short film was titled (echoing Piana’s thesis) Authentic Love and was made 
up of a series of interviews with two mothers of gay sons, one of whom had re-
cently died following a struggle with AIDS. Its purpose, as the director, Irene, sub-
sequently explained, was to bring out into the open something long regarded as 
“secret”: the coincidence of faith and homosexuality. The two mothers interviewed 
were Catholic, and spoke of their initial guilt over whether any aspect of their pa-
renting might have been indirectly responsible for their children’s homosexuality; 
this feeling, however, was soon superseded by the eponymous “authentic love” that 
they held for their children, resulting in both deciding to be as open as possible 
about their children’s sexuality, and to treat it with pride, rather than shame. As one 
of the women put it, the church hierarchy had “traduced” Jesus’s message of love 
for all, and as the director subsequently claimed in the discussion which followed, 
“guilt comes from the church hierarchy—but the church and its hierarchy are not 
the same thing: God loves everyone.” A particularly striking aspect of the film was 
its concluding interview with an elderly (now deceased) Livornese priest, who de-
clared the church to be misogynist and sexophobic; sexuality, he argued forcefully, 
was a gift from God and there could be no immorality in it. “Do we really believe 
Jesus would condemn a homosexual if he met one?” he asked rhetorically, before 
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concluding that the material of the marriage sacrament is love, and that where 
there is love, no one has the power to withhold marriage. 
A brief discussion between those on the stage followed, in which the director 
and the mother who had appeared in the film explained the purpose behind it, 
arguing that religious parents of gay children have no voice in contemporary Italy. 
Don Romano described how an encounter with a young boy in his parish, whose 
distress at being told that his desires were “against nature” resulted in an eating 
disorder, had led him to rethink what he had learnt at his seminary. But the church 
as a whole, he argued, is too large an entity to change quickly: in an interestingly so-
ciological justification for its attitudes to homosexuality, he suggested that it must 
cater to opinions that range from those to be found in Bologna to those in a Papua 
New Guinean village, and that at the moment the majority of the world’s Catholics 
were not yet as enlightened as those at the meeting that night. 
The first two questioners (an elderly man and a woman of the same age) asked 
the priests about their positions on gay marriage and reproductive rights, giving 
approving nods when both refused to support it explicitly. The third question came 
from Daniela, sat directly behind me, and unsettled the apparent affinity with the 
LGBTQ community that We Are Church were trying to elicit from the idea of “love.” 
Didn’t the speakers think, she asked, that the gay community needed to promote 
fidelity more than it did (especially in light of the risks to health involved); love, she 
said, is not the same as sex, which is what some in the community seem to think. By 
the time she had concluded, I was squirming uncomfortably in my seat and await-
ing what I assumed would be a chorus of disapproval from other audience mem-
bers: though many members of Cassero—as opposed to more radical groups—are 
promarriage rights, many of them also do not share the view Daniela was expound-
ing regarding the benefits of monogamy over a more liberal understanding of love; 
at the same time, neither do they appreciate the promulgation of the stereotype that 
gay men and women are more promiscuous than their straight counterparts.
The backlash I awaited did not materialize however; the reason for this surpris-
ing passivity became obvious when I looked around myself properly and realized 
that almost everyone in the audience was in their fifties or sixties, well dressed, and 
indeed looking nothing like the kinds of people I usually met in Cassero. Nor did I 
recognize any faces. There were, in fact, almost no LGBTQ activists present; and if 
there is one thing that constitutes a definitive obstacle to a conversation, it is the ab-
sence of one of the parties. Cassero and We Are Church, as I have mentioned, had 
been in dialogue with one another for several years, and the former’s agreement to 
host two We Are Church events during Pride had given Domenico hope that that 
dialogue would bear some fruit. The absence of Cassero members from their own 
base, during Pride week, was thus a particular blow. 
The reason for this was suggested to me after the event, when I bumped into 
Rocco, a friendly bald man in his forties who ran Cassero’s health section, and 
was also an acquaintance of Domenico. Though usually hesitant when beginning 
conversations, once they were started it was almost impossible to get Rocco to 
stop talking, and I found myself, half an hour later, still standing in the evening 
heat outside the building, as he updated me on his life and on his impressions of 
We Are Church. He had attended the debate with Piana, and I asked him why he 
thought that almost nobody from Cassero had come to this event. Look, he said, 
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I like Domenico and I’m really glad about what he’s trying to do, but this is just a 
band-aid. We Are Church are a tiny minority, and even some of their members 
don’t share Domenico’s openness. (This impression would have no doubt been re-
inforced had he heard Daniela’s question.) They’re not representative enough to 
make a difference. 
In other words, the fact that this event constituted a breakdown in an ongoing 
conversation, and not simply the failed beginnings of one, is important theoreti-
cally as well as ethnographically. Domenico had organized the event in order to 
pursue a dialogue with Cassero, a dialogue which faltered not for inconsequen-
tial reasons but because for people like Rocco, that dialogue had, in a sense, been 
too successful: Domenico’s “openness,” his efforts to commensurate his values with 
those of the LGBTQ community (see the introduction to this collection), meant 
that he had neglected the other side of such conversations: difference. He no longer 
appeared sufficiently similar to the church that his organization sought, with its 
name, to represent. Thus equally he no longer looked sufficiently different to the 
activists with whom he sought to dialogue. 
Are “we” church?
How successful were Domenico and We Are Church in communicating across the 
ethical boundaries of the LGBTQ community and the church (MacIntyre 1981; 
Mair 2014)? Did they succeed in “making a difference” by finding the “points of 
convergence” that Domenico highlighted? 
One issue with points of convergence is that they may not be as straightforward 
as they appear: the events described above could be counterproductive in terms of 
building bridges, because they could potentially reveal deep-seated differences in 
ethical outlooks as well as or instead of convergences. Daniela’s comment about the 
difference between love and sex underscored how distinct are the perspectives of 
a liberal (but observant) Catholic and polyamorists, as many in the LGBTQ com-
munity were; there is more to Catholic morality than how it accounts for homo-
sexuality, and many in “Red” Bologna’s LGBTQ community take exception to other 
aspects of it as well.
Other responses, however, were more positive: Marina, for example, a promi-
nent advocate of adoption and fertility rights for LGBTQ couples in the city who 
spoke at the 2012 Pride, held We Are Church in high esteem, and would often cite 
their members as exemplars of notable successes of the LGBTQ movement. “It’s 
true that very anticlerical people don’t trust them, but I do, and admire them very 
much,” she told me. They represent exemplars, she explained, in the sense that they 
embody the values of equality and respect that the church and the LGBTQ com-
munity should have in common. This is particularly true, she said, because they 
are not an LGBTQ group themselves, and defend the rights of the community not 
out of self-interest but on the basis of Christian principles like love and tolerance: 
“They demonstrate that the Church is not just an institution.” 
Caroline Humphrey and, more recently, Joel Robbins have both discussed the 
notion of the exemplar as an alternative to moral systems in which hard-and-fast 
rules form the basis of ethical judgments (Humphrey 1997; Robbins forthcoming). 
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As Robbins puts it in his description of Humphrey’s argument about exemplars in 
Mongolia, “Having long been subject to the play of shifting political powers that 
each define and enforce the rules in their own way, Mongols also evidence an in-
formed cynicism about the worth of such rules as guides for life . . . [and] instead 
pin their moral hopes on finding exemplary teachers” (forthcoming: 2). 
J. E. Tiles (2000), in his work on cross-cultural ethics, has identified the shar-
ing of exemplary models as one way in which ethical dialogues between different 
communities may take place. This is particularly apposite in the case of LGBTQ 
activists and the church. Behaviors in relation to rules amongst LGBTQ activists 
are ambivalent, to say the least (Heywood 2015a), and the case of We Are Church’s 
interaction with activists suggests that coming together around shared exemplary 
values is far more likely to be successful than doing so through a set of rules: in ad-
dition to a prevailing antinomianism, the fact that there exist so many differences 
within and between LGBTQ activist groups over values makes a reliance on rules 
as difficult as it is in Humphrey’s Mongolian context. This becomes only more true 
when dealing with the Catholic Church. The church’s tendency toward making ab-
solutist and universal moral judgments of behaviors makes it a frequent target of 
accusations of hypocrisy; it is also the most obvious obstacle to conciliation with 
LGBTQ groups, both because of its form (in opposition to their suspicion of ab-
solutism and universals) and, of course, because of its content (because some of 
those absolute rules are injunctions against homosexuality). As I have described, 
Domenico and We Are Church go to some lengths to avoid sounding like this. His 
refusal to use the word “truth” and their insistence that the church’s condemnation 
of LGBTQ lifestyles is a matter of historical circumstance rather than moral dogma 
are both instances, I argue, of an attempt to shift the nature of their dialogue with 
the community from one over the existence or nonexistence of certain moral codes 
to one in which they can embody certain values that are at least in principle shared 
(respect, love, tolerance). Indeed, the very act of attempting to initiate dialogue on 
an equal footing is exemplary of these values in a way in which most church en-
gagements with the community are not, as, unlike them, We Are Church’s actions 
do not consist of condemnation from the pulpit.
Thus, I suggest, insofar as We Are Church succeed in “making a difference,” it is 
through attempting to bridge the gap between is and ought that many perceive to 
exist when it comes to church teachings: many in the LGBTQ community are not 
at all unsympathetic to the spiritual aspects of Christianity, and Domenico, We Are 
Church, and people such as the mothers depicted in Irene’s documentary are all 
evidence for the fact that there are Catholics who believe that the church’s attitude 
toward homosexuality contradicts its core teachings. We Are Church, I argue, seek 
to narrow the distinction between facts and values: as with accusations of doppia 
morale (Heywood 2015a), Catholics such as Irene’s interview subjects attach their 
loyalties to the ideals of the religion, rather than the actual manner in which they 
are (not) instantiated by what they refer to as “the hierarchy.” We Are Church seek 
to put these ideals into practice, and in doing so, exemplify a shared ethical model. 
This distinction between “hierarchy” and faith maps neatly on to that delineated 
between dogma and dictum, with the former representing the (to We Are Church, 
unfounded) condemnation of homosexuality by the official church, and the latter 
standing for Catholicism’s true precepts of love and tolerance, embodied by the laity.
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But succeeding in making a difference in this sense leads to the most serious ob-
stacle to We Are Church “making a difference” in a broader sense: indifference. The 
second event that We Are Church organized, in particular, was sparsely attended 
even by their hosts, Cassero, to say nothing of the wider LGBTQ community. When 
I tried to describe the group to friends and interlocutors from other, more radical, 
LGBTQ groups, the most common response would be raised eyebrows and mirth 
at the idea of their naïvety in thinking it could change either the church or the 
LGBTQ community’s attitude to it. There was certainly no widespread inclination 
to engage with the group, as many people felt (understandably) that a church that 
regularly condemned their lifestyles from the pulpit deserved no such goodwill. 
But the problem was not simply indifference in the straightforward sense of the 
word. In fact, I suggest, the indifference to We Are Church, in the obvious sense, 
of much of Bologna’s LGBTQ community was a consequence of another kind of 
indifference—sameness.
Of course, demonstrating the affinities the two groups may (or may not) have 
shared over love or authenticity was an important part of their moral dialogue, as 
was We Are Church’s distancing themselves from Vatican homophobia. But the 
better they accomplished this, the less they actually looked like they possessed a 
distinct identity. The more that people like Rocco felt that We Are Church’s posi-
tions on issues like homosexuality were closer to his own than that of the church 
(as he understood that word), the less they appeared to be interesting conversation 
partners and the more they seemed like a fringe group that was unrepresentative of 
the institution of which they claimed to be a part.
But, of course, We Are Church claimed to be more than a part of that institution. 
Their very name, indeed, points to this: “We Are Church” should be understood, I 
argue, as an attempt at a performative statement, literally seeking to “make a differ-
ence” between the idea of the church as “hierarchy,” magisterium, the Vatican, and 
that of the church as a community of lay believers with differing views on a number 
of key issues. Because in an important sense it is not their views on subjects such as 
homosexuality that are the object of ethical communication with the LGBTQ com-
munity: the meetings that they organize and their presence at Pride make no secret 
of their position on this issue; and, of course, most LGBTQ activists find it neither 
surprising nor shocking—nor indeed particularly worthy of praise—that people 
should acknowledge their lifestyles as acceptable ways of being. What they do need 
convincing of, however, as evidenced by the discussions above, is that Domenico 
and We Are Church are anything other than a minority opinion in an otherwise 
highly centralized and dogmatic religious institution. They need convincing, in 
other words, that “church” does not only refer to the orthodoxy of the Vatican, but 
can also encompass more liberal interpretations of Catholic theology such as that 
of the “We” in “We Are Church”; and it was upon this claim—that We Are Church 
have both affinities and significant enough differences with the LGBTQ commu-
nity to constitute interesting conversation partners—that their attempt to start a 
moral dialogue faltered. In other words, by “making a difference” through finding 
common ground, they failed to “make a difference” precisely by “making differ-
ence” between themselves and their interlocutors.
Domenico himself suggested this to me when he and his friends took me for a 
coffee just before the Pride march; there he told me that not only was he happy to 
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be present that day, but he felt that it was his duty to come and make a statement. 
When I asked about how the multitude of anti-Catholic banners made him feel, he 
told me that they made him sad, as a lot of what they said about the homophobia of 
the Vatican was true; what they did not understand was that the church was more 
than the Vatican—as his group’s name suggested, the real church was the people, 
people like him, who were there to support Pride. 
Conclusion: Differing over difference
The central problem of this collection, ethics across borders, suggests certain fur-
ther questions, particularly concerning the parties to such a conversation. In the 
case I have examined, for example, I have left open the question of how far LGBTQ 
activism constitutes an “identity,” one that is capable of being a conversational part-
ner to Catholicism (which is, of course, a fragmented identity itself). It is evidently 
an analytical sleight of hand to present queer activism as if it is homogeneous, even 
more so given its constitutive concern for difference. 
I have left this question open partly because I address it at length elsewhere 
(Heywood 2015b), but more importantly because I would like to suggest that a 
focus on the construction of identity can sometimes come at the cost of a focus 
on the construction of difference. Indeed, that insight, only reversed, is a cen-
tral argument of my doctoral thesis on queer activism: that its anti-identitarian 
concern for the production of difference becomes simultaneously its constructed 
identity.
The case study presented in this article, by contrast, demonstrates the inverse 
of this point: We Are Church’s efforts to build common ground and to find af-
finities or identities with their LGBTQ activist interlocutors were well intentioned 
and important; they were also successful. But We Are Church were too successful, 
in fact, because what they eclipsed was the importance to this kind of conversa-
tion of not only constructing identity but also of constructing difference. We Are 
Church sought to demonstrate an essentially ambiguous and partial relationship 
to the Church: on the one hand, they distance themselves from its dogmatism and 
intransigence; on the other, they try to represent it, to exemplify a way of being part 
of the church without suffering from these problems. But of course the danger of 
succeeding at the first is failing at the second: the more that they convinced their 
interlocutors of their only partial fidelity to Catholicism, the more they risked the 
latter perceiving them as irrelevant and marginal to the church as a whole. As far as 
their LGBTQ activist interlocutors were concerned, in other words, they were not 
different enough from them to constitute valuable conversation partners. What the 
conversation lacked was not affinity alone, but affinity over difference, or, as I have 
called it, “agreeing to disagree.”
As a coda, it is worth pointing out that these events took place prior to the 
thaw in relations between the church and the LGBTQ community heralded by the 
election of Pope Francis. In 2013 he became the first pope to respond directly to 
a letter from a group of gay Catholics who resemble We Are Church. A number 
of well-publicized statements he has made suggest that his views are far closer to 
those of Domenico than his predecessor. The (forthcoming at time of writing) 
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Synod on the Family could herald further change. We Are Church may yet live up 
to their name.1 
To do so, they need not, as I have been suggesting, erase any and all distinc-
tions between their positions and those of their LGBTQ interlocutors. Whether or 
not Pope Francis is interested in or capable of achieving substantive change in the 
Vatican’s position on homosexuality remains to be seen. Either way, it is unlikely 
that the Catholic Church will change in all of the ways in which activists of many 
stripes might wish it to. Yet—as long as it is dialogue, and not orthodoxy (as it were) 
that interests us—this may be no bad thing. We may lament the pragmatic reasons 
for which such radical change would be impossible. But if it is difference we are 
interested in sustaining, then it is worth recognizing that the source of such dif-
ferences will often lie in identity. Agreeing about what makes the Catholic Church 
the Catholic Church will be as important as agreeing about which doctrines it can 
dispense with. 
Furthermore, the ways in which what it means to be an activist or a Catholic 
is defined and redefined through their relationship with one another are of par-
ticular salience in Italy, a country in which such identities have historically been 
determinate of people’s life-choices more broadly (see, e.g., Kertzer 1980). Yet, as 
David Kertzer’s now classic ethnography of Communist and Catholic worlds in 
Bologna makes clear, it is also a country in which such identities can become re-
markably blurred (in the figure of the “Catholic Communist,” for example). Indeed, 
elsewhere I explore how such apparently homogeneous identities may function in 
fact to articulate deeper political differences: arguing over what it “really” means 
to be left wing, for example, is often the idiom through which people in Bologna 
express radically contrasting stances on issues like homosexuality and immigration 
(Heywood in press). 
Likewise, the analytical temptation in engaging with a topic such as “ethics 
across borders” is to deconstruct the identities of the parties involved, to be “anti-
essentialist” with regard to, say, LGBTQ activism, or Catholicism, and in this way 
reveal their underlying similarities. What such an analytical strategy would miss, 
however, is that the borders within such conversations are as much a product of 
construction as the parties involved. Incommensuration, as well as commensura-
tion, is a necessary part of these kinds of dialogues, as the editors of this collection 
make clear. To construct such borders through conversation will of course involve 
a degree of essentialism (“they” are different from “us” in certain ways), but such 
essentialism is itself essential, as it were, to the conversations’ stability. 
As Naisargi Dave (2011: 662) eloquently argues with reference to a comparable 
case: “Containment does momentarily halt variation, but it is precisely those points 
. . . closure that provide the limits against which previously unimaginable forms of 
possibility are continually invented and played.” “Agreeing to disagree,” or finding 
affinities over difference—constructing the border in question, in other words—is 
a crucial aspect of ethics across borders. 
As a final theoretical aside, examining the question of agreement and disagree-
ment over difference may also allow us to address some broader anthropological 
1. Though prospects were not helped by Francis’ excommunication of one of We Are 
Church’s Austrian founders, Martha Heizer, for celebrating mass without a priest.
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problems from a different perspective. “Radical alterity,” “ontological difference,” 
and “incommensurability” have been much discussed in anthropology over the 
last few years (see, e.g., Heywood 2012; Holbraad 2012; Laidlaw 2012; Pedersen 
2012; Laidlaw and Heywood 2013; Viveiros de Castro 2015). It is largely unneces-
sary to re-state the central insight that has stimulated much of this debate, namely 
that despite the fact that since its inception anthropology has been fundamentally 
concerned with “difference,” the way in which we have traditionally understood 
the nature of such “difference” has been rather familiar—as cultural, or episte-
mological, as a matter of worldviews, rather than of worlds themselves. Neither, I 
think, is it necessary to clarify—as proponents of this perspective have done often 
(e.g., Pedersen 2012; Salmond 2014 pace, e.g., Bessire and Bond 2014)—that con-
ceiving of difference in this way does not negate the possibility of translation and 
communication— or at least of equivocation (Viveiros de Castro 2004; though also 
cf. Lloyd 2014). “Radical alterity” does not index the other side of an insuperable 
divide; it is the outcome of a failure of our own descriptive technologies, mani-
fested—for example—in ascriptions of nonsensical beliefs, such as divinatory state-
ments that are both representational and indubitable (Holbraad 2012). 
It is perhaps worth pointing out, however, that amidst these debates relatively 
little ethnographic attention has been paid to the question of how people commu-
nicate with one another about difference itself, of how to conceptualize the differ-
ences between themselves such that dialogue is possible, or not, as I describe here. 
As Amiria Salmond (2014) has recently pointed out, often the ethnographer simply 
assumes authority for such dialogue. Another alternative might be to import whole 
the model for dialogue that emerges from the ethnography, as when Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro’s (2004) concept of “equivocation” both describes Amerindian 
translation and is proposed as the methodological solution to the problem of how 
to put Amerindian translation into dialogue with our own ideas about it. 
But note that my concern is not that we have failed to investigate different ideas 
about “difference”; it is that perhaps we have not sufficiently attended to ethno-
graphic ideas about agreement (or disagreement) over difference. This is a question 
not so much of translation as of metatranslation: How do people dialogue about 
the conditions that enable, or hinder, such dialogue? This would perhaps be the 
ethnographic equivalent of Michael Lambek’s (2008)—sophisticated and thought-
provoking theoretical proposition that sacrifice may be a site at which metavalue—
a relationship between economic value determined by choice and ethical virtue 
determined by judgment—may be articulated. Instead of only asking about incom-
mensurability or commensurability, this would entail asking how people make the 
incommensurable commensurate, not by erasing difference but by agreeing that 
things are different and how. 
In the somewhat mundane case I have described here, a failure to do just this 
renders a dialogue unsuccessful. But it is hard to imagine a reason why cases of 
“radical alterity” cannot be examined in a similar manner: why stop at establishing 
that something is “radically alter” from something else, and not ask also whether it 
is capable of recognizing this difference itself, and if not why not? When we as an-
thropologists recognize such alterity as alter, we laud ourselves for our openness to 
difference and our appreciation of the challenges involved in speaking across this 
difference. Yet surely we are not the only ones capable of doing so. 
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Accord sur désaccord: l’activisme LGBTQ et l’église en Italie
Résumé : En 2012, l’antenne de Bologne de Nous Sommes l’Eglise, un groupe de 
catholiques laïcs et libéraux qui font du lobbying au Vatican en faveur de l’adoption 
d’une position plus progressive de l’Eglise sur divers sujets, notamment l’homo-
sexualité, a tenté d’établir   un dialogue avec la communauté LGBTQ de la ville. 
Afin de garantir le succès de ces discussions, Nous Sommes l’Eglise devait persua-
der ses interlocuteurs anticléricaux, qui nourrissent une forte antipathie à l’égard 
du Vatican, qu’il constituait une entité entièrement différente de la « hiérarchie » 
catholique. Mais en adoptant cette position, le groupe créa un obstacle à sa propre 
démarche  : plus il se distinguait efficacement du catholicisme orthodoxe, plus il 
s’éloignait du sens de sa déclaration éponyme « Nous sommes l’Eglise » ; plus il se 
rapprochait des positions des activistes LGBTQ, plus son projet risquait d’être dis-
crédité pour son manque de rapport avec le catholicisme et d’être jugé sans impor-
tance. Ainsi, dans ce cas, l’éthique par-delà les frontières dépend non seulement 
des affinités soulignées et des différences maintenues entre deux groupes, mais 
également de la recherche d’affinités au sujet du maintien des différences. De la 
même manière, je suggère que les débats en anthropologie au sujet de la différence 
radicale gagneraient à s’instruire des façons dont la différence elle-même peut être 
le sujet d’accord et de désaccord. 
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